# Applying Formal Verification to Reflective Reasoning

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# Who am I?

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Theorem Proving in HOL







Source: Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford. See also: https://intelligence.org/why-ai-safety/









#### Highly Reliable Agent Design





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- Foundations
- Basic problems lacking in-principle solutions





#### Highly Reliable Agent Design

- Foundations
- Basic problems lacking in-principle solutions

(Note: This is not MIRI's only research agenda.)



One problem within MIRI's 2014 agenda happened to seem to align with my expertise, theorem proving and self-verification



#### **Problem Statement**



Design a system that

- always satisfies some safety property,
- but is otherwise capable of arbitrary self-improvement.



# Too little self-trust

# Cannot make simple self-modifications

Too much self-trust Unsound reasoning about successors



#### Overview

#### Reflective Reasoning

- Self-Modifying Agents
- Vingean Reflection
- Suggester-Verifier Architecture
- Problem and Partial Solutions

#### Implementation

- Botworld
- Formalisation in HOL



## **Reflective Reasoning**



#### The Agent Framework





## The Agent Framework



#### Cartesian boundary

agent computed outside environment



### Reality is not Cartesian





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$$\pi_n(o_n) = (a_{n+1}, \lceil \pi_{n+1} \rceil)$$



< @ >

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# Vingean Principle

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Relevance Self-improving system must reason about programs it cannot run: its successors



# Vingean Principle

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#### Approach

Formal logic as a model of abstract reasoning











Verify:  $\vdash u(h(\pi, a)) \ge u(h(\text{default}))$ 





Verify:  $\vdash u(h(\pi, a)) \ge u(h(\text{default})) \ (\approx \text{Safe}(a))$ 



# Problem with Self-Modification

#### Argument for Safety of Successor

- ► To create a successor, must prove that its actions will be safe
- If successor follows s-v architecture, it will only take actions it has proven to be safe
- However, to conclude that an action is *actually* safe from a *proof* is problematic.



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  This principle, T ⊢ □<sub>T</sub> ¬φ¬ ⇒ φ, is inconsistent.
  (Gödel/Löb)



#### Partial Solutions

. . .

# Descending Trust $T_{100} \vdash \Box_{T_{99}} \ulcorner \varphi \urcorner \implies \varphi, T_{99} \vdash \Box_{T_{98}} \ulcorner \varphi \urcorner \implies \varphi,$

#### Partial Solutions

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Model Polymorphism  $0 < \kappa, T \vdash \forall n. \Box_T \ulcorner \varphi(\bar{n}) \urcorner \implies \varphi[\kappa - 1/\kappa](n)$ 



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If Safe(a) 
$$\equiv \forall n$$
. Safe(a, n)  
Take  $\varphi(n) \equiv n \leq \kappa \implies$  Safe(a, n)



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$$\forall a. \Box \ulcorner \forall n \leq \overline{t+1} + \kappa. \operatorname{Safe}(\overline{a}, n) \urcorner \Longrightarrow \\ \forall n \leq t + \kappa. \operatorname{Safe}(a, n)$$



# Implementation



## Botworld: Concrete Framework for Embedded Agents



Robots can construct/inspect/destroy/program other robots



#### Semantics

• step : state  $\rightarrow$  state



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- ▶ step : state  $\rightarrow$  state
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- state-with-hole for proposed action
- steph : s-w-h  $\rightarrow$  a  $\rightarrow$  (obs, state) option



# Suggester-Verifier Implementation

 $sv(\pi_{default},\sigma,obs)$ :

- 1.  $(\pi, a) = \operatorname{run} \pi_{\operatorname{default}}$
- 2.  $(\pi', a', \text{thm}) = \text{run } \sigma(\text{obs}, \pi, a)$
- 3. Check thm has correct form
- 4. Write  $(\pi, a)$  or  $(\pi', a')$  accordingly



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Reflection Library Automation for:  $\Box \ LCA \ \bar{k} \implies P \$ implies LCA  $(k+1) \implies P$ 



Implementation Challenge

#### Project Proposal

# Build a Botworld agent that self-modifies into a *provably safe* agent of the same architecture.



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# **Eventual Project**

Discover how far theorem proving technology is from implementing the above...



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#### Theorem Proving for AI

- Specifications Needed!
- Novel Architectures for AI Systems, e.g., improve on Suggester-Verifier to support logical induction and non-proof-based reasoning
- Reducing Problems to Functional Correctness

